Introduction
Hotter countries are poorer on average than cooler countries. The broad form of this relationship is easy to recognize -Europe is both cooler and richer than South America, which is both cooler and richer than Africa -and it has played an important, although often indirect, role in several recent studies of development and growth. In these studies, social scientists have sought to understand how climate and geographical features as well as historical accident have affected the fate of nations. Gallup, Sachs, and Mellinger (GSM) label this the "new geography." Norcihaus gives a particularly wide-ranging discussion of how temperature has been viewed as a factor in economic activity, particularly at the individual level, as when worker or student performance is affected by ambient temperature.
The specter of global warming makes temperature's role in the economy especially important, and it is for this reason that it deserves especially thorou scrutiny.
One way of gauging how warming will affect an economy is to look at the economic performance of countries that are warmer. If global warming is going to make Cameroon's temperatures (73.8°) more like the Central African Republic's (78.3°), then the difference between Cameroon's income ($1,444) and the CAR's ($1,1131) may ve a measure of the costs of global warming. Such direct, econometric evidence rarely been exploited in research on global warming. Even if it must eventually be tempered by other explanations, such a comparison is highly valuable. In this paper, we look at ta Ve thank Marc Nerlove for helpful comments and Jeremy Castle for research assistance.
for 156 countries.
There are, of course. many possible reasons why hotter countries are mostly poorer, such as climate's effects on disease. agriculture , capital depreciati on, worker productivit y, or human behavior, say in the form of culture or institution s. The number of candidate pathways is large. The most important distinction , however, is not among these various paths but between effects that are contempor aneous, that is, due to current climate, and those that are historical, that is, due to past climate. Historical effects are those that arose because climate played a role at some time in the past, but this role is no longer important. In other words, cool climates may have given some countries a head start but the reason for that head-sta rt no longer affects current economic performanc e.
Climate's past role would still be observable if because of it cooler countries acquired higher levels of capital or better institution s, which would then lead to higher current incomes. Since current climate is similar to past climate in the cross-secti on, a relationship between current temperatur e and income would still appear in the data.
The distinction between contempor aneous and historical effects is crucial because only when climate's effects axe contempor aneous does the cross-secti onal income temperatur e relationshi p yield evidence about possible economic effects of global warming. Note that all of the candidate pathways -sease, a culture, c depreciatio n, worker productivit y, institution s -could comely bly be ei er co= raneous, historical, or a combinati on of both.
The widespread belief is that the income-t emperature relationshi p is mostly historic We generally concur. Acemogiu , Johnson, and Robinson (AJR) have recently made great gains in identifying a specific historical path. They co vincingly argue ht mortali ty rates of early coloniz ing settlers had a profou nd effect on the institut ions that were set up in those colonie s. These institut ional differe nces persist to this day (becaus e of transac tions costs. collecti ve choice proble ms. and irrever sible investm ent), they argue, and have strong effects on current per capita income s. Becaus e early mortali ty and average tempera ture are highly correla ted, the mortali ty-i nstituti on-in come relatio nship also manifes ts itself as an income -temper ature relatio nship. The AJR argume nt that institut ions form the path betwee n historic conditi ons and present income s was also made by Choinie re and Horowi tz, who argued that if the historic al explana tion of tempera ture is correct , the data suggest that cooler countri es did not simply accumul ate higher (physic al) capital stocks: they must have acquire d better institut ions as well.
There is, howeve r, sufficie nt evidenc e to warrant continu ed examina tion of the income-t emperat ure relation ship. First, we find a strong income -temper ature relatio nship within OECD countri es, a result that does not appear to be predict ed by Ailt's colonia l mortali ty model and that other authors seem to disavo w. Second , we find that income-t emperat ure relatio nship is essentia lly the same within the OECD and non-O ECD countri es, a striking yet unrema rked and as-yet unexpla ined result. Third, we find an excepti onally strong income-tempera ture relatio nship within the fifteen countri es of former Soviet Union, where colonia l institut ions would seem to have been wiped out.
These finding s, along with several related results, are the subject of s paper. It is Jso worth noting that a signific ant relatio nship betwee n income and average tempera ture exists within the United States (Horow itz; Ram 1999), another situatio n where crosssection al differe nces in institut ional quality , inherit ed from past institut ions, would not seem to be a m•jor factor. This finding is not taken p in le current paper.
Other results confirm the AJR findings, although even these often suggest a second, separate role for temperatu re. In regressio ns with both temperatu re and settler mortality data as explanato ry variables, we find that settler mortality provides greater explanato ry power than temperatu re: but temperatu re continues to exhibit a moderatel y large effect on income. When we look at countries not included in AJR's data set, many of which are not former colonies. we continue to find roughly the same income temperatu re lent.
We do not propose a specific hypothesi s, either contempo raneous or historical , for the findings we uncover. Instead. we focus on identifyi ng the main internatio nal evidence that does not appear to be explained , so far, by the AIR historical model. We then assess its implicati ons about the costs of global warming. In the process, we discuss the role of temperatu re in economic activity -a role that we find both persistent and consisten t -and the issues involved in uncoverin g and interpret ing that role.
Literatur e
This literature has looked at both income and owth, but the questions and approach es have been similar and so we discuss them as one. Most such papers have focused on either the role of latitude (Hail and Jones; Nor ; Ram, 1997 Ram, , 1999 eil and Chen; Theil and Finke: Theil and Seale) , e percentag e tropical (GSM), or a si,-dichotom y between temperat e and tropical countries (Masters and McMillan ) .
common result: "Affluen ce tends to decline when we move toward the Equator" (   ,pier   14eil and Seale, p. 403). Masters and McMillan use a temperatu re-rather than latitude-based defi 'don of the tropics.
Authors differ on why latitude (distan ce to the equator ) has such a strong effect, althoug h its correlat ion with tempera ture -with tempera ture then affectin g disease or agricult ure -is at the heart of most explana tions. Thus, our treatme nt of tempera ture as a continu ous variable should improv e on these studies. Only dayligh t is more closely correlat ed with latitude . Dayligh t could, of course, have signific ant on econom ic perform ance (see Nordha us' cite of Woodruf f), but this pathwa y does not appear to have been taken very seriousl y. Distanc e to Europe , another variabl e correla ted with latitude in the norther n hemisph ere. is also unlikel y to explain the income -temper ature or income latitude relation ship, since there is a signific ant income -temper ature gradien t among the 35 countri es of the souther n hemisph ere, where cooler countri es are farther from Europe .
AJR's explana tion for the observe d connect ion betwee n tempera ture and income has already been mention ed. Hall and Jones make a similar argume nt for ie storic role of distanc e from the equator , based on western Europe an influen ce on institut ions develop ed when these countri es were coloniz ed. They suggest that "Weste rn Europe ans were more likely.. , to settle regions of the world that were sparsel y populat ed at the start of the fifteent h century-and in areas that were "broadl y similar in climate to Wester n Europe " (p. 101). Both items are likely highly correla ted with colonia l mortali ty and also with tempera ture. The Hall and Jones explana tions would clearly benefit from empiric analysis of historic populat ion densitie s or climate similari ties; as it stan their testable implica tions, for this paper's purpose s, are not as sharp as Ala's.
A few studies have looked more explicit ly at tempera ture's role. Masters and McMill an look at the effect of number s of frost-f ree days. Frost has a direct role in reducin g pests and pathoge ns that may be missed by a focus on ave e tempe Vine They show that frost free days has a significa nt effect on populati on density and cultivati on intensity even when average temperat ure is included as an explanat ory variable. They do not look at joint effects of temperat ure and frost-free days on incomes .
Other There are several tempera ture-re lated issues that arise in our measure of income.
Heating expendit ures in cold countrie s are conside red a "plus," but the amenity value of the climate when space heat is not needed is not included . This differen ce has the effect of exaggera ting the utility losses from higher temperat ures. Put another way, the incometemperat ure relation ship and any implied measure of the "cost" of higher tempera tures exclude s the amenity value of climate. ir-con dolling expense s cause problem in the opposite directio n but on a global scale titese are much less importa nt than heating expense s.
The income measure s also exclude other non-m arket goods such as pollutio n enery, and drinking water quality and quantity are o y partly account ed for. To the extent that these goods are affected by temperat ure, the observe d income temper are relations hip will differ from the true utility -tempera ture relations hip. If pollution 's effects are exacerba ted by warm temperat ures or if the value of drinking water is higher in warmer countries , then the observed income -tempera ture will underest imate the conseque nces of higher temperat ures.
Temperat ure. Many different climate measures are possible . Since our interest is in global warming , some measure of long-r un average temperat ure will be the most useful single climate variable. It is importan t to note that the "best" climate measure( s) is both a question and an answer. That is. if economis ts had a better understa nding of how climate affects incomes , then it would be clear which climate variables would be appropria te for regressio ns. But developi ng this understa nding is the purpose of those regressio ns in the first place.
We use long-run average temperat ures in the capital city as reported in www.worl dclimate .com. Alternat ives to using the capital city's temperat ure pose the followin g sorts of problems . A country' s temperat ure averaged over the entire country will include economic ally irrelevan t areas (think of Canada. ) Weighti ng temperat ures by the amount of economi c activity in an area would be extremel y difficult given the lack of spatially dense economi c data for much of the world and would introduc e a fT at deal of endogene ity, since the location of economi c activity is essential ly what we hope t explain. Therefor e, we focus on a single point in each country.
We chose the capit city because it seemed the "most exogeno us" and still likely to be represent ative of the conditio ns under which economi c activity takes place in each country. A country' s geograph ic center, for example is exogeno us but not necessari ly represent tive of the temperat ures under which economi c activity occurs. The largest * city may be more represent ative but is "less exogeno us" than the capital city. For these reasons. we focus on the capital city's temperat ures.
Our focus on temperat ure at a single location is the most problema tic for countries with a large degree of temperat ure variation . An interesti ng question, deservin g of further research, is whether countries have tended to locate their capitals in the cooler put of their countries . as Australia . China, .and India appear to have done.
Temperat ure data were not readily available for a few countries , mostly small island countries . Because of their smallnes s, and to keep the temperat ure data consisten t,
we decided not to pursue these. The ten countries with GNP data that we exclude are Antigua and Barbuda; Bermuda : Brunei: Dominic a; Maldives ; Seychelle s; Swazilan d; St.
Kitts and Nevis; St. Lucia: and St. Vincent and the Grenadin es.
Other explanat ory variables . Our investiga tion of temperat ure's role uses a spare reduced-f orm. Because temperat ure is so clearly exogenou s at the country level, we try to use only explanat ory variables with a similar de wee of exogenei ty. Other commonl y used explanat ory variables such as savings rates. populati on growth, or measures of institutio nal quality or "social character " are themselv es possibly influenc ed by temperature and so either should not be included as re essors or else sho d be modeled jointly with income. We focus on three sorts of reuFessor s besides temperat ure: resource endowme nts; former Soviet bloc; and tourism.
Oil producti on data are from the Energy Informat ion Administ ration's International Energy Annual. Table G2 . We used 1998 producti on of crude oil, natural gas, other liquids, and refinery processin g gain, in thousand s of barrels per day. Coun es no entry were given a value of zero. 0 er possible measures , such as reserves, seemed too impreci se for our purpose s and the data did not have as wide a coverag e.
Coal product ion data are also from the Interna tional Energy Annual , Table F5 . We used 1998 product ion in trillion s of BTUs.
In general , "form of govern ment" should be conside red endoge nous. Yet at least one form might be conside red exogen ous, namely being part of the former Soviet bloc (FSB). We use a standar d definit ion of the FSB that include s the fifteen former Soviet republi cs, seven formerl y commun ist Europe an countri es (Alban ia, Bulgari a, Czech
Republi c, Hungar y, Poland . Romani a. Slovaki a), Mongol ia, and three countri es of the former Yugosla via (only Croatia . Macedo nia, and Sloveni a are include d in our data), which were not truly bloc countri es but whose econom ies were sufficie ntly similar that they warrant being include d with the bloc.
Temper ature-dr iven tourism -as when someon e from a cool country visits a hot country , primari ly for its beaches and sunny weathe r -is an exampl e of a role for tempera ture very differe nt from the ones describ ed in the introdu ction. We attempt to separat e these roles by incorpo rating a measur e of tourism as an explana tory variabl e.
We looked at two sources of tourism data: Interna tional tourism receipt s by country of destina tion (1998) Polynes ia, which has an extreme ly high standar d-of-l iving based on the GNP (compa rable to Italy's) . had only 7 percent of its GNP as tourism receipts .
We therefore use a dummy variable for whether the country has a tourism-ba sed economy. All countries with a percenta ge at least as high as Fiji's were given a dummy variable of 1. Thus. the followin g eleven countries are consider ed tourist economie s in our data: Bahamas. Jamaica. Cyprus. Malta. Grenada. Vanuatu, Belize, Croatia, French
Polynesia , and Fiji. The decision to choose Fiji as the cut-off is arbitrary but not controver sial because the countries just below the cut-off were Lebanon , Singapor e, and Austria, none of which represent s the kind of economy we wish to account for. All countries other than these eleven are non-t ourism economie s.
Sample selection . There are 40 countries for which GNP data are not reported.
Some of these countries contain significa nt populati on (Afghani stan, Burma), unlike the missing-tempe rature countries . Since these countries tend to be poor, often quite poor, their absence from the data has the potential to affect the estimate d income-t emperatur e relations hip if they have temperat ures different from other poor countries . We have ready temperatu re data for 23 of these countries , including all that are large in area or populatio n except for Cuba. The populati on-wei ghted average temperat ure for these is 70.3% which is higher than the populati on-we ighted average temperat ure for all non OECD countries ; the unweight ed average is 70.7°. Thus, while it is not possible to tell what effect the omission has on our estimates , it is most likely hat our estimate d income temperatu re gradient is smaller in absolute v tie han he client. Cuba's ave temperatu re is around 77°, so its exclusio n from hese c culations UTLuer suggests ft the estimated income-tem perature gradient will be smaller than the true one. Tables 2 and 3 where these countrie s are included in the OECD set.
For simplicit y, we sometim es refer to the absolute value of the coefficie nt on
In(TEM P) as y. This paramete r measure s the predicte d percenta ge decrease in GNP for a one percent increase in the long-ru n average temperat ure.
There are two major findings . There is a substanti al income -tempera ture gradient within OECD countries and this is, for all practical purposes , identical to the lent in non-OECD countries . It may be tempting to think either that temperat ure would have less of an effect in develope d countrie s (0 < ?OECD < Ynon-OECD ) or even that the differen ce between OECD and non-OE CD temperat ures would account for all of observed income-tem perature gradient (yoEcD = Ynon-OECD = 0).
clearly contradic ted by these results. Regressi on 3 shows that the worldwi de income -tempera ture gradient is -3.46, quite similar to the -3.42 measure d by Choinier e and Horowit z using 1985 data for 97 countrie s with no correcti on for oil or coal producti on or being a tourist economy .
Therefor e, being in the OECD. most of whose countrie s are cool, accounts for about 60 percent of the world's observe d income -tempera ture gradient .
While it seems interesti ng to understa nd why the OECD countrie s are cooler than the others, we believe this differen ce is best viewed as historica l, since it is hard to imagine a country breaking down so severely as to no longer have an OECD econom y because of a change in temperat ure. It is slightly more plausibl e to imagine that global warming mi t delay a country' s becomin g ready for the OECD. In is case, global warming would be consider ably more costly than the income -tempera ture ents of regressi ons I and 2 predict. All of the cubics indeed show a cool region over w ch an increase in temperat ure raises incomes. In regressio n 5, the hump is at 44.0*. For regressio n 6 it is 44.2*.
Function al form
Canada, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, which have average temperat ures below 44*, are all predicted to benefit from increasin g temperat ures, a hi y plausible result.
The predicted hump for the non-OE CD countries is almost identic 44.1' for regressio n 8 and 43.2* for regressio n 9. This is another instance in which the income temperat ure relations hip is essential ly the same for both OECD and non-OE CD countries .
The cubic estimates also predict that there is a second region of much er temperatu res over which an increase in temperat ure again raises incomes. This turns out to be essentiall y irrelevant . For the OECD countries , the second turning point is at and 65.2° in regressio ns 5 and 6 -at the very upper range of the OECD temperat ures.
For the non-OECD countries , the second turning point is at 81.7° and 85.9° in reu-ssitt ns 8 and 9. These are the very upper range of non-OE CD temperat ures.
Comparat ive Statics,. To see the conseque nces of different functiona l forms we to eir predictio ns about the effects of temperat ure change. For a given tern mature change , we use the regress ion results to calcula te the predict ed change in GNP and multipl y it by populat ion for each country . These are then summe d over the countri es used for that regress ion and compar ed to current total GNP. constru cted from multipl ying current GNP by populat ion for each country and summin g. This procedu re is also used to estimat e the costs of global warmin g in Section 6.2
Results are shown in Table 4 . We report the implied percent age change from current total GNP for a 1.5° and 3 F tempera ture increas e (for all countri es), based on regress ions I through 9. These tempera ture change s are at the lower end of those predict ed for global warmin g. Our calcula tions assume that populat ions are unchan ged.
In the log-log regress ions, a tempera ture increas e will unambi guousl y lead to a decreas e in total GNP. Further more, for the reasons describ ed above, the percent decreas e in GNP will always be greater than y times the percent increas e in averag e tempera ture, since a given tempera ture increas e is a higher percent age increas e in cooler countri es, which are on average richer.
For the cubic regress ions, a tempera ture increas e need not lead to a decreas e in total GNP since some countri es are predict ed to benefit. All of our results, howeve r, show decreas es in total GNP of roughl y the same magnit ude as the log-log m that all of the cubic models predict a large tempera ture re on in which tempera ture gradien t is steeper than the compar able log-log predict ion.
The log-log functio n implies that income decreas es are concav e in n dei. Note a * mee temperature change whenev er y> I. In other words, a 30 tempera ture increas e produc es less than twice the income decreas e of a 1.50 increas e. The cubic functio ns do not imply concavi ty, but all of our results exhibit it. Such concavi ty makes sense, since income s can never fall below a survival level.
We find implied income decrease s of 3.74.4 percent for a 1.5° F increase in OECD countries and about three-qua rters of a percent less for non-OE CD countries . For a 30 F increase, we find implied income decrease s of 7.1-8.3 percent in OECD countrie s and 5.9-7.2 percent in non-O ECD countries . These numbers show that the effects of temperat ure change are nearly linear in the change; the degree of concavit y is quite small.
Other Results
Former Soviet bloc. Our results suggest that former Soviet bloc economi es are not significa ntly different from other non-O ECD economi es, conditio nal on their temperature (regress ions 2, 7, 8, and 9). This observat ion has not been made to our knowled ge.
Oil and coal. The data contain seven OPEC members (Algeria , Indonesi a, Iran, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia. U.A.E., and Venezuel a). We tested whether a similar result to the Soviet bloc holds for OPEC countries . Althoug h OPEC members hip is hi y correlate d with oil producti on, it is possible to run regressi ons 7, 8, and 9 with added dummy variable for OPEC (not shown); this is possible because there are several non-OPE C countries with compara ble levels of per-cap ita oil producti on, such as Gabon, Congo, Bahrain, Angola. and Russia. The OPEC coefficie nt is small and insi 14* Ticant in iIl cases (t-ratios of less than 0.50). Other coefficie nts, includin g the oil per-cap ita van are essential ly =change d. We conclude that OPEC countrie s too are essential ly the as other non-OECD countrie s once oil endowme nts and temperat ure are acc tinted for.
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(Note that if energy reserves, particula rly oil, were not included in he regressi ons, e income-temper ature gradient wou d likely be mismeas ured, since oil and tempe twe happen to be highly correlat ed.) Tourism . Countrie s endowed with resource s that appeal to tourists are significantly richer than compara ble non-endowed countrie s.
Further Evidenc e
In this section, we look more explicitl y at the historica l explanat ion put forth by AJR. We are intereste d in the extent to which the observe d income-t emperatu re relations hip is due to an historica l effect of colonize rs' mortalit y, which is strongly correlate d with average temperat ure (r---0.55. n=69). We approac h this in several ways.
The connecti ons between colonial mortalit y and past instituti ons or between past and current instituti ons, both insights of MR, are not the focus of our research .
Two Coloniz ed Regions . In Table 5 , we examine Africa and the western hemisphere, two regions that consist almost entirely of former colonies and that should show particula rly strong income-m ortality effects, and thence income -tempera ture effects.
Results show that the income -tempera ture gradient is indeed large for these regions, with ?Africa = 2.43 and ywii = 1.82 (regress ions 10 and 11, respectiv ely). We treat this finding as evidenc e in favor of the AJR explanat ion. It is especi ly interesti ng to note that a large and signific ant income -tempera ture lent exists even within Africa, since a general -that is. non-ec onometri c -view might conclud e t observed income-tem perature gradient (re e w ession 3) is due largely to *fferenc e between "neo-Eu rope-and Africa. The previous section demonst rated I a ent exists within the OECD; in this section, we have demonst rated that a gradient also exists within Africa. Again, it is worth noting that this finding is particula rly surprisi ng since a lot of cross-sec tional temperat ure variation is removed when focusing on Africa.
Countries with Mortality Data. In regressio ns 12 and 13, we examine countries for which AJR reported colonial mortality , based on extensive research by Curtin and also by Gutierrez . In regressio n 12, we include log of mortality (A.JR's fourth mortality estimate in their Appendi x Table A2 ). It is a strong predictor of current per-capita GNP and appears to have substanti ally greater explanato ry power than temperat ure. In this regressio n, we treat OECD and non-O ECD countries the same, since the mortality explanati on should account for the differenc e between these two groups.
Temperat ure's effect is diminish ed but still relatively large, even if imprecise ly measured . We find that even among these countries , strongly influenc ed as they were by the colonial experienc e, a one percent increase in average temperat ure is associate d with a 0.9 percent decrease in per-capita GNP.
In regressio n 13, we show what the income -tempera ture relations hip looks like when mortality is not included . We remove the OECD countries to allow comparis on with regressio ns 15 and 16, discusse d below. The income -tempera ture gradient is much larger than regressio n 12, of course, and is comparab le to what we measure for se colonize d regions in Table 5 , as indeed it must be. (When we include OECD countries , so that the country sample is the same as regressio n 12, the temperat ure coe cient is -3.06, close to the worldwid e gradient found in re ession 3.)
Former Soviet Union. We next looked at the fifteen countries of the fo er 11 Soviet Union (regressi on 14), a set of countries for which the which He mortality explanati on would be unlikely to apply, since colonial -era instituti ons were largely obliterated and homogen eous instituti ons imposed. Still, a large income -tempera ture ent appears . This is in fact the largest income -temper ature gradien t we measur e and it is particu larly striking given the small number of observa tions and appare nt homoge neity of the sample : Not long ago. this regress ion would have been a within -countr y re session , Countri es without Mortali ty Data. We then looked at all non-OECD countri es for which AJR do not report mortali ty data. This set include s countri es for which the coloniz ation experie nce was roughl y the same as others for which there was mortali ty data, like Benin and Zimbab we. and countri es that were not former colonie s or for which the coloniz ation experie nce was much differe nt. like China, Thailan d, and Saudi Arabia .
If the data were compos ed entirel y of these latter countri es, then we would expect to find the income -temper ature relatio nship to be roughl y the same as that found in regress ion 12, equal to -0.91. On the other hand, if the data were compos ed mostly of the former countri es (i.e.. former colonie s for which we just did not have mortali ty data), then we would expect to find the income -temper ature gradien t to be more like that found in regress ion 139 since it would be capturi ng both mortali ty and temper ature effects .
For the mix of countri es that we analyz e. we expect someth ing in betwee n. We look only at non-OEC D countri es becaus e. withou t mortali ty data, we have no other way to capture the differe nce betwee n the OECD and non-O ECD.
Results are shown in regress ions 15 and 16. In regress ion 159 the ' it come temper ature gradien t is -1.04. In regress ion 16, we add former Soviet Ibi t.C coun in es.
The gradien t is essenti ally unchan ged at -1.05, althoug h now much more precise ly measur ed. (This is again eviden ce that FSB countri es are like other non-O EC I" countri es once tempera ture is accoun ted for.) These coeffic ients are larger than re salon 12 smaller than regress ion 139 as predict ed. Our results also demonstrate the income-mo ity connection. Colonial mortality, as reported by A.M. is strongly correlated with average temperature and, for the set of countries for which comparison is possible, a stronger predictor of current income than temperature . Formerly colonized regions such as Africa and the western hemisphere
show especially large income-te mperature gradients.
Nevertheles s, a further role for temperature appears t exist. Even when ms rty is included as a regressor. the temperature effect is relatively large, -0.9, th imprecisely measured. When temperature 's role is estimated for countries fwr ch mortality data are unavailable, it f is between this estimate and le estimate for those former colonies when mortality is not accounted for.
The large income-tempe rature slope win the former Soviet Union is sirg especiall y since these countrie s were not subject to the same pattern of colonial instituti ons as much of the rest of the world. The magnitud e is similar to the slope when OECD and non-OEC D are measure d together (regress ion 3), which suggests that a substanti al part is probably due to some economi es being "more Europea n." Exactly what this entails is as yet unknown . This explanat ion slightly weakens our claim that the former Soviet bloc (and by extensio n, the former Soviet Union) is similar to the rest of the non-OECD except for temperat ure.
Our conclusi ons must be stated carefully . There is diffuse yet strong evidence that the relations hip between income and temperat ure, observed in various cross-sect ions, is due to more than just the effect of temperat ure on colonial mortality . The pathway for this relations hip is unknown . Colonial mortality is not the only possible historica l role for temperat ure, althou it is compelli ng as such. AIR show that current instituti ons have no additiona l explanat ory power for current income once the effects of colonial mortality are accounte d for. and they argue against the historica l (and empirica lly untested ) explanat ions of H 1 and Jones. Thus, it appears to us that the remainin g income-tempe rature gradient is most likely contempo raneous. Our best measure of Hs contemp oraneou s effect is that a one percent increase in temperat ure leads to a -0.9 percent decrease in per capita income.
Implicat ions for Global Warming
When the income-te mperatur e relations hip reflects the effects of conte poraneou s temperat ure. comparat ive statics calculati ons yield estimate s of income changes caused by global warming . When y = 0.9, a 1.5° F increase in tempe ture le to a 2.35 percent decrease in world GNP. A 3 F increase leads to a 4.58 percent decrease, and a 4.5* F increase leads to 6.70 percent decrease. These calculations assume that the temperature increase is the same across all countries, although some global warming models predict different increases depending on latitude, and that populations are unchanged. These are our best guesses of the effects of global warming, conditional on predicted temperature changes.
These measures are roughly linear in y. If y = 1.35, as in regressions 1 and 2, then a 3' F increase leads to a 6.78 percent decrease in world GNP. If y = 0.45 (a roughly equal distance on the other side of -0.9 and close to the coefficient measured for MSAs in the U.S.), then a 3° F increase leads to a 2.32 percent decrease in incomes.
We have not specified the mechanism s through which temperature 's effects are felt. Many factors may contribute, including disease, agriculture, capital depreciatio n, worker productivity , and institutions. Untangling these is a task for further research. If higher temperature s delay a country's becoming an OECD-t ype country, the costs of global warming will be larger.
Cross-Sectional Measures and Tourism. Our procedure for measuring e c sts of global warming has several important limitations. In the absence of trade (clearly an unwarranted assumption here), the cross-sectio nal method would yield an underestima te of the effects of temperature change, because it does not include the costs of ejusting to a new temperature . It assumes that countries can costlessly and inune ately develop structure to match a new climate as countries currently operating at Ht temperature have done.
the presence of trade (but without adjustment costs), the cross-sectio nal model may produce either an under-or overest imate of the effects of tempera ture change. The reason is that it is the vector of tempera tures that determi nes trading patterns and incomes . Thus. any change in tempera ture is "out of sample " and its effects unknow n.
The smaller is the amount of tempera ture -depend ent trade, the smaller will this effect be and the closer will be the cross-se ctional estimat es to the true effects of tempera ture on countrie s' economi es, except for adjustm ent costs.
This concern is why we have remove d the effects of tempera ture-depen dent tourism in our regressi ons. Tempera ture-depende nt tourism is, by definiti on, temperature-depe ndent trade. since it involve s people from one (cooler ) country travelin g to another country that is warmer .
Further Researc h
We see two related goals for further researc h: a concept ual and then an empiric al model that allows trade. includi ng tempera ture -depend ent (i.e., tempera ture-ge nerated ) trade, and that allows both within-country and between -countr y tempera ture effects.
Empiric al studies of income variatio n within countrie s, particul arly for countrie s like the United States or China which have large cross-se ctional tempera ture variatio n, should be particul arly useful for underst anding the possible econ mic effects of tobal warmin g.
The specific ways in which tempera ture affects econom ic perform ance, boJ contemp oraneou sly and historic ally, are just beginni ng to be uderst ood much more research . 
